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This letter addresses some of the immediate consequences of Basic and Applied Social
Psychology’s (BASP) ban on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and confidence
intervals. The letter concludes with three suggestions to improve research in general.
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The editorial board of Basic and Applied Social Psychology (BASP) made a bold
and unequivocal move by outright banning the use of Null Hypothesis Significance
Testing (NHST) and confidence intervals, along with giving Bayesian methods at
best conditional consideration (see Trafimow & Marks, 2015). BASP’s reasoning
behind said ban is based on common concerns of Frequentist statistics in particular,
though concerns of Bayesian statistics were also considered. The reasons for said
ban are not of interest here, but rather BASP’s particular solution. They stated:
…BASP will require strong descriptive statistics, including effect sizes. We
also encourage the presentation of frequency or distributional data when this
is feasible. Finally, we encourage the use of larger sample sizes than is typical
in much psychology research, because as the sample size increases,
descriptive statistics become increasingly stable and sampling error is less of
a problem. (Trafimow & Marks, 2015, p. 1)
Although BASP’s intentions to improve the quality of research are
commendable, what is not immediately evident is how the use of strong descriptive
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statistics and larger sample sizes constitute a framework by which inference on a
population may be made. By relying on descriptive statistics alone, BASP removed
the notion of probability from their statistical methodology, save for the
occasionally sanctioned Bayesian analysis. As a consequence, the scope of BASP’s
scientific inquiry is therefore limited to the description of samples rather than
inference to populations. The danger here is this limitation will not stop some
readers from making inferences to populations, but will instead only remove the
theoretical basis for doing so–thus blurring the distinction between interpretations
of inferential and descriptive statistics.
What is especially curious about BASP’s aforementioned stance is their
notion of sample size and its curative effects over the stability of descriptive
statistics and the size of the sampling error (which are the foundational elements of
the confidence interval, simply removing probability). Though descriptive statistics
can become more stable and sampling error can decrease as sample size increases,
this is only true in part.
The point can be illustrated by use of M&M’s©. Assume there is a single
42oz “party-size bag” of M&M’s and 20 bags of the regular 1.69oz store-size bags
(totaling only 33.8oz), randomly sampled from different stores. Which would
produce the better estimate of the color proportions from the factory machine
settings: the proportions of the 42oz bag or the mean of the proportions of the 20
1.69oz bags? Granted, there is probably only a small difference between the two
estimates, by design due to quality control. But if one machine goes out of control
and fills a bag with too many green M&M’s, the 42oz bag will be both large and
largely biased, while the 1.69oz bag will be just one sample out of many.
The issue is clear: sample size alone cannot ensure better estimates of a
population, the sampling methods by which a sample is procured are of the upmost
importance. To quote former American Statistical Association president Peter
Lachenbruch “A large n means nothing if the sampling is biased” (Cochran, 2015,
p. 17). The nicety of the M&M’s example is presumably the factory settings
(population) are known and we could randomly sample the 1.69oz bags of M&M’s,
if we so desired. Unfortunately, this is difficult in the social and behavioral sciences,
all the more reason why Morrison and Henkel (1969) asserted:
…for statistical inference to be possible one must first specify the population
and then probability sample from that population. The notions of sampling
distribution and sampling error have no meaning in statistical inference apart
from the assumption of randomness in the sample selection procedure–
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randomness being a central feature incorporated in all probability sampling
designs. (p. 133)
Indeed, sampling error consists of two components: random and systematic. By
increasing the sample size, only the random component of sampling error becomes
less of a problem, while the systematic part remains unchanged. As for the stability
of descriptive statistics, the law of large numbers ensures statistical consistency of
estimates as sample size increases, but again, this property is predicated on the
sampling being random; thus, biased sampling using large sample sizes can result
in consistent and biased samples.
The point here is not to condemn research done without random sampling–
random sampling is difficult if not prohibitive for many studies, more especially
those in the behavioral, educational, and medical sciences; rather, it is to illustrate
how BASP’s newly adopted methodology is not somehow more resilient to the
aforementioned issues, relative to Frequentist and Bayesian methods. Ironically, by
requiring authors to use large sample sizes and report descriptive statistics, BASP’s
prescripts would only help these inferential frameworks, if they were allowed.
Instead of removing inference from their methodology, BASP could improve the
quality of research by requiring authors to do the three following things:
1.

2.

3.

Clearly state the population of interest; not only does this help readers
understand the scope of the research, it also provides useful
information for conducting meta-analyses and replication studies.
Use random sampling methods, when possible. When random
sampling is not possible, authors should be required to report what
sampling methods were used, why random sampling could not be used,
and likely sources of bias in the existing sample, including reporting
detailed demographic statistics. This allows readers to evaluate the
quality of the study sample, in reference to the population of interest.
Instead of relying on one all-or-nothing sample, authors should be
required to collect multiple samples when possible (e.g., multiple
schools, hospitals, etc.). In addition, BASP should promote publication
of replication studies from existing research.

Implementation of these requirements could certainly be considered state of the art.
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